Abstract
Introduction
In the US being black has been associated with a wide range of disadvantages (Burke, 2008) : blacks earn less than whites (Bergmann 1971 , Smith and Welch 1989 , Altonji and Blank 1999 , Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey 2001 , Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity 2007 , Charles and Guryan 2008 , and have relatively lower marriage and couple formation rates (Spanier and Glick 1980, Hamilton, Goldsmith, and Darity 2009 ).
Many states in the US have a tradition of open discrimination against blacks in marriage markets in the form of miscegenation laws that were instituted by white legislatures and led to historically low racial intermarriage rates (Fryer 2007, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011) . Increases in black/white intermarriage rates since the 1960s may have resulted from a reduction in such discrimination and the Supreme Court's 1967 decision ruling against miscegenation laws. A recent analysis of internet dating also indicates a disadvantage to being black in the US: Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely (2006) estimate that relative to white men, African American men received only about half as many first-contact e-mails from white women.
Furthermore, Spanier and Glick (1980) and Hamilton et al. (2009) have documented that in the US black men who marry white women have higher education, income and occupational status than endogamous (marrying within their own group) black men, possibly indicating that black men have to 'pay' their way into marriage with white women. Similar differentials were found for immigrants marrying natives in Australia (Meng and Gregory 2005) , France (Meng and Meurs 2009) , and Germany (Nottmeyer 2011) . In all these cases, women seem to prefer men from their own group and expect some 'compensation' when marrying minority men.
In this paper, we test whether in US marriage markets blacks are also disadvantaged in terms of spending more time on chores when in couple with whites than when endogamous. Our conceptual framework is based on Becker's (1965) theory of allocation of time and Becker's (1973) second Demand and Supply model, a model assuming that a market mechanism influences who marries whom as well as distributions of the gain from marriage (taking the form of intra-marriage allocation of time and money). Some distribution differentials across marriage markets may be a function of racial intermarriage: whites may get higher distributions when in couple with blacks than when endogamous, while blacks may get lower distributions when in couple with whites than when endogamous.
Previous studies have examined the association between distributions of the gain from marriage and labor supply, including Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) , and Lafortune et al. (2012) . The association between intermarriage and participation in the labor force was tested for ethnic intermarriage among Israeli Jews (Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1988) and for racial intermarriage in Hawaii (Grossbard-Shechtman and Fu 2002) . In all these analyses of (unobserved) distributions of the gain from marriage and labor supply, it is assumed that leisure is preferred to work in the labor force. An advantage of turning to chores as a testing ground for theories linking marriage market analysis with allocation of time is that by definition chores are less desirable than leisure. It could be more likely that limited access to the gain from marriage will lead to higher involvement in chores work within the household than to higher labor force participation. In this paper, we examine whether US whites spend less time on chores when in couple with blacks than when endogamous, and whether blacks spend more time on chores when in couple with whites than when endogamous.
Our empirical analysis builds on a growing literature on allocation of time to household production that includes John and Shelton (1997) , Hamermesh (2002) , Bittman et al. (2003) , Kalenkoski, Ribar and Stratton (2005, 2007) , Aguiar and Hurst (2007) , Kimmel (2007, 2009) , Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2008) , Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008) , and Sayer and Fine (2010) . While previous US timeuse studies have controlled for race or investigated racial differences, our study is the first to focus on how individual allocation of time to household production varies with racial intermarriage.
Using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] we focus on the association between a spouse's race and the time that respondents allocate to chores (we use the terms 'marriage', 'husband', 'wife', 'spouse', and 'endogamy' even though some couples are cohabiting outside marriage). Some of our models take account of selection into intermarriage to address the possible endogeneity of the decision to perform chores and the choice of a spouse of a different race.
We find that white women in couple with black partners devote less time to chores (0.36 fewer hours per day) and housework (0.60 fewer hours per day) than their endogamous counterparts. The absolute size of these coefficients is similar to the effect of a child on women's time devoted to chores. White men also spend less time in housework if intermarried with black women than if endogamous, but estimated effects are smaller than for women and often insignificant statistically.
Even though results for blacks are less robust than for whites due to smaller sample size, they are also consistent with whites' preferred group status in marriage markets: when in couple with whites black women seem to devote more time to chores and housework than when endogamous. Results for black men seem to go in the same direction, but are less conclusive than those for black women.
Taken together, our findings suggest that blacks pay a price for being in couple with whites rather than being endogamous: they are likely to obtain fewer minutes of chores from their white partners, and they are likely to perform more minutes of work themselves. Conversely, relative to their endogamous counterparts, whites in couple with blacks benefit in the form of less own work in chores. They may also obtain more chore work from their black partners.
Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 sets out our main conclusions.
Conceptual framework
The model's basis is Becker's (1973) second Demand and Supply model of marriage, a model Becker did not include in his Treatise on the Family (Becker's 1981) even though he has endorsed it as recently as 2004. 2 Like in other marriage models included in the Treatise, this Becker model assumes heterosexuality and that household production is the goal of marriage, where marriage includes non-marital cohabitation. 2 Excerpts from a personal email: "I never abandoned my view that imputations to men and women are determined by a competitive marriage market -what you call the 'supply demand' framework." and "My Treatise was considered by me to be a complement to my previous work, not a substitute. So I did not go over everything in the earlier papers that I considered to be valid and sometimes even important." (Becker 2004 ). For more on Becker's models of marriage see (Grossbard 2010 ).
Becker's better-known Demand and Supply model of marriage (included in the Treatise) is one in which he assumes only one type of man and one type of woman. In contrast to this first Demand and Supply model the second Demand and Supply model of marriage contains multiple types of substitutable men M and women F. Figure 2 in Becker (1973) , reproduced here as Figure 1 , is a graphic representation of a market for one particular type of man i M and one particular type of woman i F , the price being e, men's share of the gain from marriage. Let us replace Becker' Becker (1973) 3 then leads to insights regarding the distribution of the gain from marriage between men and women, making it the first economic analysis of intra-household distribution. 4 Becker's second Demand and Supply model builds on analogies with similar comparative statics analyses in which individual agents choose between substitute products, workers, jobs, or houses. The following assumptions underlie such analysis:
(a) Transferable utility: this assumption is essential to the operation of a price mechanism. Becker interprets e ( ' ii e ) as a price. (b) Price ' ii e is given when individual demands and supplies are derived in market ii MF. Becker follows the standard two steps in Marshallian market analysis, first assuming that the price is given and deriving an individual demand and supply by a representative agent, and then in a second step (after aggregation of all individual demands and supplies) obtaining the equilibrium price. 5 3 One of us attended lectures and workshop sessions on economics of the family at the University of Chicago in the late 1970's in which Becker expanded on this second Demand and Supply model of marriage. 4 Analyses of intra-marriage distribution are also found in bargaining models such as Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) , collective models such as Chiappori (1988) , and models that follow more directly from Becker's second Demand and Supply model such as Keeley (1977) , GrossbardShechtman (1984) and Choo and Siow (2006) . 5 There are some parallels between these two steps and the two steps of the collective or consensual models in Samuelson (1956) , Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988 Becker (1973) derived that: "The division [of output, i.e. e] is determined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons…" (emphasis added). Becker (1973) does not explicitly define 'human capital' in the context of this demand and supply model of marriage. However, based on other parts of Becker's theory of marriage and on the courses he taught when he was writing on marriage markets it is clear that human capital includes the skills and endowments enhancing productivity in household production that are of value in the process of mate selection. The higher an individual's human capital, the more he or she is likely to be in demand in a marriage market. 6 Some of this marital human capital is general in the sense that general human capital is defined in Becker (1964) : one person's human capital is useful to different potential substitutable partners (also see Becker, Landes and Michael 1977 , Chiswick and Lehrer 1990 , and GrossbardShechtman 1993 . Individuals with more general human capital will be in higher demand in multiple marriage markets, and human capital can be approximated by years of schooling.
step includes establishing a sharing rule. In the traditional Marshallian analysis behind Becker's (1973) second Demand and Supply model the market price functions as a sharing rule. ' ii e using the notation introduced here. Likewise, equilibrium shares/prices are established in all related markets for marriages in which this type of men and this type of women participate, including K -1 other types of women and R -1 other types of men. This part of Becker's analysis, typical of Marshallian market analysis, rests on further assumptions not elaborated upon here. This could be a hedonic market analysis in terms introduced by Rosen (1974) after the publication of Becker (1973) and is compatible with Choo and Siow's (2006) hedonic marriage market analysis. 7 Based on the second Demand and Supply model, Becker (1973) states that division of marital output is affected by sex ratios and other variables (emphasis added). The other variables introduced here are race and preferences for same-race marriage (racial endogamy). In each hedonic market for men of type i (i = 1 to R) and women of type i (i = 1 to K) equilibrium values 0 ' ii e , men's share of the gain from marriage in market equilibrium, are a function of individual characteristics of the participating men and women that influence demands or supplies.
We now invert the subscripts and consider marriage markets in which supply is by women of different types and demand by men of different types. Consider a vector of male characteristics X i that can possibly shift the demand by men i M and a vector of female characteristics j Z that can possibly shift the supply by women of type j F in a particular ji FM market. These characteristics will affect the equilibrium levels of women's shares of the gain from marriage: Applying this framework to marriage markets stratified by race, we focus on four markets: endogamous markets for whites, endogamous markets for blacks, markets for marriages between black men and white women, and markets for marriages between white men and black women. We assume that both blacks and whites prefer endogamy and that preferences for endogamy are stronger among whites than among blacks (possibly due to whites' discrimination against blacks that is not totally reciprocated by blacks' discrimination against whites).
For example, consider marriage markets in which white women W F are the suppliers, and where both X and Z are dummies for 'white'. Women W F are choosing between black men B M and white men W M . To the extent that some white women prefer to marry white (rather than black) men it follows that white women's market supply to black men in this interracial marriage market will be smaller than their aggregate supply to white men in the market for endogamous marriages.
If all other factors are controlled for and the demand in both markets is the same, comparative statics analysis leads to BW e > WW e in equilibrium, implying that white women will obtain a higher portion of the gain from marriage if they are in couple with black men than if they are endogamous. That the demand is the same implies that white men and black men have the same willingness to marry white women. This assumption can be relaxed.
BW e >

WW
e is expected to hold as long as black men's demand for marriage to white women does not lie below white men's demand for marriage to white women by an amount equal or higher than the difference between white women's supply to black men and their supply to white men.
To the extent that all participants in a market are influenced by market equilibrium conditions, this prediction holds even for individual women who do not discriminate and don't intend to divorce and threaten their husbands with their relatively high marriage market power.
We can't measure shares of the gain from marriage e or e', but we know that most individuals prefer leisure (e.g., relaxing, socializing after work, doing exercise, out-ofhome leisure, listening to music) to work, where work includes much home production. Therefore people are likely to translate higher share of the gain from marriage in a marriage market into a lighter workload in home production and more leisure: intrahousehold distributions of the gain from marriage are likely to be positively related to leisure time, and negatively related to time spent doing chores or working in the labor force (see Grossbard-Shechtman 1984 , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002 , Lafortune et al. 2012 ). 8 It is assumed that there are no racial differences in how share of the gain from marriage translates into hours of chores: a given differential in share of the gain from marriage BW e -WW e translates into a corresponding intermarriage differential in amount of time spent on chores. 9 We therefore expect white women in interracial marriages to perform fewer chores compared to their counterparts in endogamous marriages.
Unobserved intra-household distributions of the gain from marriage are also a function of income, number of children, and other relevant variables. The better we control for these variables, the more we are likely to find that white women married to black men will supply fewer hours of chores than endogamous white women (prediction 1).
Furthermore, if white men prefer to marry white women (and such preference for endogamy is incompletely reciprocated by black women), this amounts to a relatively small demand for black women in interracial marriages relative to the demand for black 8 Leisure may be more enjoyable than home production to the extent that the former activities provide a higher "experienced utility" to the individuals (Kahneman et al., 2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) . 9 This assumption could be relaxed. Our predictions are reinforced to the extent that white women married to black men also have higher ability to translate a given share of gain from marriage into less time in chores. The intermarriage differential in time spent on chores will then be larger than the differential in women's share of the gain from marriage BW e -WW e . If the opposite is the case and white women married to black men are less able to translate a given share of gain from marriage into less time in chores this will weaken the prediction. It will only invalidate the prediction if white women are considerably less able to bargain about chores if married to blacks than if married to whites and the racial intermarriage differential in ability to translate an intermarriage differential in share from gain in marriage and that black men married to white women will work more at chores than endogamous black men (Prediction 4). All four predictions are more likely to be supported by empirical evidence when household production activities are more likely to be considered as chores. This is more likely: a/ on weekdays than on weekends. On weekends, when both members of a couple are more likely to synchronize household production, performing the same household production activity may be more enjoyable than it is during the week. Also, the type of activities left for the weekend may be more enjoyable than the activities performed on weekdays (Hamermesh 2002 , Jenkins and Osberg 2005 , Connelly and Kimmel 2009 ).
b/ for married than unwed. Relative to unwed couples, married couples are more likely to establish implicit contracts involving distribution of the gain from marriage as well as division of labor in the household. Therefore, determinants of share of the gain, such as interracial marriage, are more likely to be associated with time spent on chores for married than for unwed couples. c/ when respondents are not employed in the labor force or they have limited working hours. More chore-type activities are likely to be reported by respondents who are not employed or work few hours in the labor force than by fully employed men and women. The more respondents engage in chores or housework, the more we are likely to observe an effect of intermarriage on household production time.
d/ when spouses are fully employed than when spouses are not fully employed. Respondents with fully employed spouses are more likely to engage in household production: it is more likely that they have implicit contracts (possibly related to marriage contracts) regarding division of labor, with respondents doing more chores and spouses bringing in more earned income.
3.
Data and Methods
Data and Definitions
We use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), the first federally administered, continuous survey on time use in the US, for the years 2003 (see Hamermesh, Frazis and Stewart 2005 . Respondents are randomly selected from a subset of households that have completed their eighth and final month of interviews for the Current Population Survey (CPS). They are interviewed (only once) about how they spent their time on the previous day. We restrict our analyses to non-retired/non-student married or cohabiting respondents between the ages of 21 and 65, who have time diaries that add up to a complete day (1,440 minutes).
We define Chores in two ways. Following Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2008) , we define chores as activities that satisfy Margaret Reid's (1934) third-party rule: they can possibly be substituted for market goods and services. In addition, we use a more restrictive definition that only includes activities for which women have negative income elasticities. These are activities that women would rather avoid doing if they can afford to. More precisely, for this more restricted definition we require that elasticities with respect to own years of schooling (a proxy for permanent income) and own actual earnings be below -0.01. 10 The following activities fit this more restricted criterion and are called 'chores': interior cleaning, laundry, grocery shopping, kitchen and food cleanup, travel related to housework, travel to/from the grocery store, and food and drink preparation. They correspond to what has been referred to as "female tasks" e.g. by Cohen (1998 Cohen ( , 2004 , Hersch and Stratton (2002) , and Sevilla-Sanz, Gimenez-Nadal and Fernandez (2010) . 11 We also perform robustness of our 'chores' regressions including basic childcare in addition to chores.
Given that the time devoted to household production by men in the US has been shown to be limited relative to that of women (Aguiar and Hurst 2007, Hersch 2009 ), we use a broader and widely used definition of chores for men: total time devoted to household production activities excluding childcare. We exclude childcare as a number of studies have found that parents report spending time with their children as being among their more enjoyable activities (Juster and Stafford 1985 , Robinson and Godbey 1997 , Kahneman et al. 2004 , Kahneman and Krueger 2006 . We include the following activities in our definition of Total Housework: meal preparation and cleanup, laundry, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor household cleaning, indoor design and maintenance (including painting and decorating), time spent obtaining goods and services (i.e., grocery shopping, shopping for other household items, comparison shopping), and time spent on other home production such as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning, and vehicle repair. We also use Total Housework in robustness checks for our estimations for women.
Black is defined as being "black only" or "black-white", according to the CPS classification that also includes categories such as Black-Asian and Asian-White. White is defined as being "white only". We have also estimated our models with alternative definitions of 'black' (e.g., excluding the category "black-white"), with results being consistent and available upon request. Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for some of the variables used in the analysis for both men and women. It can be seen from columns 1 and 4 that men devote much less time than women to both Chores and Total Housework: 2.1 and 3.4 daily hours to Chores and Total Housework in the case of women, versus 0.6 and 1.8 hours in the case of men. Given that our data includes a much larger number of white respondents than black respondents (17,531 white women and 15,627 white men versus 1,305 black women and 1,270 black men) we first analyze whites.
Columns (2) and (3) describe the data for white and black women, Column (5) for white men and Column (6) for black men. It can be seen that on average white women spend slightly more time on chores than black women (2.1 vs. 1.9 hours per day). Slightly less than 1% of white women have a black husband or partner, while the percentage of intermarriage (including unmarried cohabitation) is much larger for black women (4%). White and black men in our sample devote 1.83 and 1.71 hours per day, respectively, to Total Housework. The percentage intermarried is about 40 times higher for black men than for white men: 12% versus 3 per thousand. Black men are more than twice as likely to be intermarried than black women, which is consistent with other studies (Kalmijn 1993 , Blackwell and Lichter 2000 , Crowder and Tolnay 2000 . Average years of schooling are 13.9 for women and 13.8 for men.
Empirical Strategy
We begin with regressions of Chores performed by women. We first run OLS regressions of time in chores as a function of intermarriage and of a number of characteristics of respondents and their spouses, as well as characteristics of the household. However, since we observe a high proportion of "zeros" in the time devoted to chores by women and housework by men, it may be preferable to use alternative models, such as those of Tobin (1958) or Poisson, or a Negative Binomial model. According to Frazis and Stewart (2012) , OLS models are preferred in the analysis of time allocation decisions, since estimation techniques for limited dependent variables that assume a non-linear functional form, such as the Tobit model, will be inconsistent if we want to estimate means of long-run time use from a sample of daily observations. Gershuny (2012) argues that estimations derived from single-day diaries have the problem of too many zeros, but traditional diary studies can still produce accurate estimates of mean times in activities for samples and subgroups. Under this framework, Foster and Kalenkoski (2013) compare the use of tobit and OLS models in the analysis of time devoted to childcare activities, and find that the qualitative conclusions are similar for the two estimation methods. We have also estimated tobit, Poisson and Binomial models and our qualitative conclusions are the same (results available upon request). In view of our experience and that of Foster and Kalenkoski we solely report OLS results here.
We estimate the following equation:
Chores =α +Intermarried δ +X δ +Day δ +Year δ +ε
where Chores is the time devoted to chores by woman "i" in state "j" and year "t", measured in hours per day, and Intermarried is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent "i" in state "j" and year "t" is "married" to a partner who is black, in the case of white respondents, or white in the case of black respondents. We expect to find 1 0   in the case of white respondents, and 1 0   in the case of black respondents.
Initially it is assumed that whether a person is 'intermarried' or not is exogenously given.
Vector X includes a number of demographic and economic characteristics of wives and husbands, as well as household characteristics (see Appendix Table A3 for a summary of all variable definitions). It includes age of the respondent (and its square), age difference, spouse's age squared, the interaction between respondent's age and age difference, wife's education, education difference, wife foreign-born, and husband foreign-born. In addition, it includes own wage, spouse's wage, a dummy variable for respondent's disability, and a dummy variable to control for participation of the spouse in the labor market. We also include day of the week dummies, to control for changes in time allocation decisions depending on the day of the week (reference day is Friday), and year dummies (reference is 2009) to control for changes in survey methodology or the possible impact of the economic crisis of 2008.
The age difference and education difference between spouses are included as they may affect individual relative bargaining power within a marriage. Square of age is expected to capture particularly large age differences between spouses, which may be associated with compensating differentials taking the form of lower work load in the household (fewer chores) or extra monetary transfers from husbands to wives and therefore lower labor force participation by married women (see Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1988) .
To the extent that education captures permanent personal income, its effect on time spent doing chores will be similar to that of wage discussed below. In addition, education may be positively related to a person's human capital that enhances productivity in household production and more educated people may be in higher demand in markets for spouses. For both of these reasons more educated people may perform fewer chores. The more educated the spouse relative to the respondent, the less it is likely that the spouse performs chores and the more the spouse may have a demand for the respondent's chores (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993) so to the extent that husband's chores and wife's chores are substitutes it is expected that the higher the spouse's relative education, the more the respondent performs chores. This result may be facilitated through mate selection or through bargaining within the household after a couple is formed. However, to the extent that partners like to perform chores together, and their time in chores is complementary, higher relative education of the spouse may be associated with fewer chores by the respondent.
Ever since Becker (1965) it has been assumed that the wage is the opportunity cost of the time devoted to household production. Accordingly, there is a large empirical literature on time use examining the impact of wages and income on time allocation, including Hamermesh (1990) , Kalenkoski et al. (2005 Kalenkoski et al. ( ,2007 , Friedberg and Webb (2006) , Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008) , Kimmel (2009), Bloemen, Pasqua and , and Stancanelli and Stratton (2010) . We expect individuals with higher wages to perform fewer chores. Spouse's wage is expected to be positively related to chores due to an income effect and substitution effects. However, the inclusion of hourly wages of individuals poses an empirical challenge, as individuals who do not participate in the labor market do not have a real value for their hourly wages.
We compute hourly wages of individuals who do not participate in the labor market using their predicted wages (see Lee and Pitt (1986) for an early general discussion). More specifically, we calculate predicted log of hourly wages using a large CPS sample and the Heckman (1979) two-step technique which includes equations for both employment and wages. We allow for non-linear effects and bootstrap in order to obtain more robust standard errors. Variables used to identify the employment equation are the number of children of different ages in the household, respondent's student status and ownership of place of residence, unemployment rate in the state of residence, and whether any household member owns a business or farm. Variables used to predict wages are marital status, no high school education, more than high school education, age and its square, dummies for black, Hispanic, region of residence, and urban. Region of residence and 'urban' follow CPS categories.
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Vector X in equation 2 also includes household non-labor income defined as the total family income of all family members during the last 12 months, minus husband's and wife's annual earnings. This includes business income, rental income, pensions, dividends, interest, Social Security payments, and any other non-labor income received by family members who are 15 or older. Total family income ranges from less than $5,000 to $150,000, where each value of the variable represents the mid-point of the income interval. Non-labor income is set at zero when annual earnings exceed total family income. A negative relationship between income and time allocated to home production has previously been reported, (Robinson and Godbey 1997 , Hamermesh 2007 , Aguiar and Hurst 2007 , possibly the result of outsourcing of home production. Restricting chores to activities with negative income and education elasticities is expected to limit income effects.
Household characteristics also include number of children in the household aged 0-4, 5-12, and 13-17. We expect a positive correlation between number of children and time devoted to chores, with this correlation being higher for younger children. In addition, vector X includes urban residence and region (the reference being West).
Two variables purposely omitted from X are married status (married or not) and respondent's labor force participation. These are endogenous to the decision on how much time to devote to chores. We took account of these factors by estimating separate regressions by married status and labor force status. In the case of labor force status we distinguish between respondents with no or low labor force participation (working less than 10 hours a week, LLFP) and those working 10 hours a week or more. We also estimate separate equations for weekdays and weekends and for married and unmarried couples.
We test for robustness of our estimates for women by re-estimating our models using Total Housework instead of Chores.
Household Chores and Selection into Interracial Couples.
Out of concern for the non-randomness of matching into interracial couples, and to separate this non-randomness in matching from the non-randomness in the allocation of time, we follow an approach similar to that used by Meng and Gregory (2005) . They estimated simultaneously economic success and intermarriage between immigrants and natives. In our case, we provide a simultaneous estimation of intermarriage and white women's time in chores (sample size is not sufficiently large to allow us to estimate the three equations for the sample of black women). We estimate this model for all white women. "Husband" includes "live-in partner" and "married" includes "cohabits". The two equations are: Chores is the time devoted to chores by woman "i" in state "j" and year "t", measured in hours per day and ijt Husband Black is a dummy variable indicating whether a woman "i" in state "j" and year "t" is "married" to a partner who is black. We estimate the 2 equations simultaneously as well as the disturbance covariance matrix using an OLS degrees-of-freedom adjustment. That way we allow for correlation between the error terms of the equations, while taking into account that decisions regarding time devoted to household chores and partner selection are made simultaneously. 13 Vector X in equations (3) and (4) includes a common set of explanatory variables: age of the respondent (and its square), the age difference between the couple, spouse's age squared, the interaction between respondent's age and age difference, wife's education, education difference of the couple, wife foreign-born, husband foreign-born, own wage and spouse's wage (using predicted wage in case there is no labor force participation) 14 , a dummy variable for respondent's disability, a dummy variable for the husband's labor force participation, household non-labor income, number of children in the household aged 0-4, 5-12, and 13-17, urban residence and region.
To identify this system of equations we include variables that are unique to each equation and therefore serve as instruments. To identify the time devoted to Chores, we use the variables that refer to the day of the week the respondent filled a diary in the ATUS survey (vector ijt CH ). Day of week is expected to influence time devoted to Chores (e.g., more time during weekdays, Connelly and Kimmel 2009) but not the probability that the reference woman has a black husband.
The variables used to identify the intermarriage equation (4) are in vector ijt HB . They include state availability ratio, 'Loving' dummies related to state laws regarding miscegenation, regional averages on an attitudinal question about opposition to marriages between blacks and whites obtained from the General Social Survey, the (log of) population density of the state, and interactions between density and some of the other variables. The availability ratio is defined as
, where n is the number of white men available for a woman in state "j" and year "t", and N is the total number of all men of marriageable age observed in state of residence "j" and year "t". Respondent's age is defined in 5-year age groups. Given that the difference in mean age at marriage in the U.S. is close to 2 years, we use men who are 2 years older than the women (Amuedo-Dorantes and Grossbard 2007).
The 'Loving' dummies aim at controlling for whether the state of residence has had anti-miscegenation laws, i.e. laws that forbade marrying across racial lines, and whether states with such laws were forced to repeal them as a result of the 1967 US Supreme Court decision 'Loving v. Virginia' (388 US 1). This is based on Fryer (2007) who considers four groups of states: i) states that never had laws against black-white marital unions; ii) states that repealed such laws before 1900; iii) states that repealed such laws after 1900, but before 1967; and iv) states that repealed their laws only after the Supreme Court ruling. We combined the states that voluntarily repealed their antimiscegenation laws, and only use two dummies for states that never had antimiscegenation laws and states that voluntary repealed such laws before the Supreme Court ruling. We expect white women to be less likely to intermarry in states that repealed anti-miscegenation laws only after the Supreme Court decision.
Inspired by Charles and Guryan (2008) we also use information based on an attitudinal question in the GSS, namely "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?" From here we estimate regional averages on degree of opposition to marriages between blacks and whites. We have calculated the mean value of this variable for white women for each region in the year 1982. 15 The responses of interest to this question are "yes" (1) or "no" (2), where we have recoded "no" to value 0. Consequently a higher value for this variable indicates a stronger opposition to interracial marriages among white women in this region. The last instrument is the (log of) population density, obtained as the population in the state divided by the size of the state in squared kilometers. A higher population density may imply better functioning marriage markets and decrease the probability of racial intermarriage for white women who prefer to marry white men. However, regional population density may also be positively correlated with more open economic, political, and social institutions and a larger proportion of white women who don't discriminate against blacks. In either case population density reflects characteristics of regional marriage markets that may mitigate the effects of laws or mate availability. We therefore interact the availability ratio, the "loving" variables, and attitude towards interracial marriage with the state's population density.
We test for the validity of the estimated model as follows. First, we compute the spearman's correlation coefficient between the residuals of the 2 equations, and look at the significance of the correlation. A coefficient that is statistically significant at standard levels would imply that the residuals are not independent and that endogenization of the interracial marriage decision is needed. Second, we look at the instruments' relevance by looking at whether they are statistically significant. For a correct specification of the model, some instruments in each equation must be statistically significant. Third, we compute the spearman's correlation coefficients between the residuals of the two equations and the instruments included in the other equation, and look at the significance of the coefficients. If we obtain that none of the instruments in one of the equations has a statistically significant correlation with the residuals of the other equation, we can assume that instruments are exogenous to the dependent variable of the other equation.
Results
We first discuss how the variable of principal interest, spouse's race, affects respondent's time devoted to chores. In section 4.4 we look at other determinants of time devoted to chores and housework, with a focus on education, wage and age. A discussion of most results is found in section 4.5. Table 2 shows the results of estimating time devoted to Chores by white women using equation (2) and OLS. The reference category in Column (1) is a childless white woman living in the West and observed on Friday. It can be seen from that column that, relative to endogamous white women, intermarried white women devoted 0.36 fewer hours per day to Chores: < 0 as predicted. This result, based on a comparison of 160 intermarried and more than 17,000 endogamous women, is significant at the 5% level. The effect is quite large: in absolute value the effect of presence of a black partner lies between that of number of children above age 5-11 (.32) and number of children under age 5 (.39).
Women
We also find that < 0 only holds for weekdays. While based on a smaller sample of 8,694 women interviewed on weekdays, of whom 78 were intermarried, this result is significant at the 1% level. This makes sense, for on weekends activities such as shopping or cooking are more likely to be considered as leisure and less likely to be inversely related to intra-marriage distribution.
A comparison of cols. (4) and (5) reveals that our finding of a negative delta holds only for married women. For them, the effect of intermarriage is a reduction of 0.45 of an hour of chores per day, which is larger than the effect of number of children under age 5 (in absolute terms). This result is significant at the 1% level and based on more than 100 intermarried white women out of a total of more than 16,000. A stronger effect was predicted for married than for unmarried women, given that they are more likely to 'work' in chores while their husbands work in the labor force. We also estimated chores regressions for women with limited labor force participation, a group likely to include 'housewives' (LLFP; col. 6). While this result is based on only 33 intermarried couples, it suggests a larger effect of intermarriage on chores by housewives than by women employed in the labor force: Col. 7 indicates no effect of intermarriage for white women who work at least 10 hours a week in the labor force. This difference in the effect of intermarriage by women's employment status also makes sense within our conceptual framework.
A comparison of cols. (8) and (9) reveals that our finding of a negative delta holds especially for married women with employed spouses. The effect of intermarriage on chores is 0.37 of an hour per day for married women with employed spouses, with this result being significant at the 1% level and based on more than 100 intermarried white women out of a total of more than 14,000. However, the result for white married women with non-employed spouses is based on only 22 intermarried couples and suggests a very large effect of intermarriage on chores by white married women with non-employed husbands. Table 3 shows parallel results for black women. These results are solely of a suggestive nature, as they are based on slightly more than 1,000 women, of whom only 53 were intermarried. We had predicted > 0. Column (1) reveals that even though the coefficient of intermarriage is positive and in absolute value slightly larger than the corresponding coefficient for white women, it is not statistically significant. This lack of statistical significance is related to the small sample size. However, a positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient of intermarriage is found for weekdays, but based on only 501 observations, including 27 intermarried women.
Consistent with the predictions, we thus find a negative effect of intermarriage for white women and (tentatively) a positive effect for black women. This contrast is not due to black women performing more chores in general: overall black women spend less time on chores than white women. In contrast to the positive that we find on weekdays, black women seem to perform fewer chores on weekends when intermarried than when endogamous. Sample size does not permit a further breakdown between married and unmarried, or LLFP and non-LLFP in the case of black women. Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for both white and black women when we use a broader definition of time devoted to household production: Total Housework as defined above. Results for women are thus robust to alternative definitions of time devoted to household production. As in the regressions of Table 2 using the more restricted 'chores' measure of housework, we observe in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 that intermarried white women devote less time to total housework than endogamous white women, and that this effect appears to be larger on weekdays (Column (2)), for married women (Column (3)), and for women with limited labor force participation (Column (4)). We also re-estimated a regression for black women interviewed on weekdays (Column 5) and found a result very similar to that obtained using 'chores' as the dependent variable (Table 3) .
We also tested whether our results are robust to a further expansion of the definition of chores including time devoted to basic childcare (e.g., physical care for children, organization and planning for children, looking after children, care for children not specified, use paid childcare). Regressions including basic childcare in the definition of chores (available upon request) yield results similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 , although the coefficients of 'husband black' (in the case of white women) and of 'husband white' (in the case of black women) are lower in absolute value when chores include basic childcare than when that is not the case. We find that in the case of married white women with low labor force participation-for whom we found large intermarriage effects using our restricted definition of chores--when basic childcare is added to the definition of chores the coefficient of 'husband black' is negative but not significant.
White women, controlling for selection into intermarriage
Next, we deal with the question of whether the statistically significant coefficients of intermarriage that we reported for white women indicate effects of intermarriage on chores or originate from selection into intermarriage by women less prone to perform chores. Alternatively, an unaccounted variable could simultaneously cause intermarriage and lower levels of chores among white women. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 show the results of estimating equations (3) and (4) on the time devoted to Chores by white women, considering selection into intermarriage.
It can be seen that after we take account of selection into intermarriage, white women in couple with black men devote 0.36 of an hour less per day to chores. That result is identical to the 0.36 coefficient of chores in the simple model reported in Table  2 (col. (1)). Furthermore, the rest of regression 3 in Table 4 is very similar to regression 1 in Table 2 . It thus appears that selection into intermarriage do not help explain the association between chores and intermarriage.
Regarding the identification of the 2 equations, some of the variables that are used as instruments are statistically significantly in the two equations. In the case of the Chores equation (not shown in table 5), day dummies for Monday, Saturday and Sunday are positive and statistically significant: women in the US devote 0.187, 0.59 and 0.35 more hours to Chores respectively on Monday, Saturday and Sunday. In the case of the equation for selection into interracial marriage, the following instruments are significant: availability ratio, opposition to Black-White marriages, population density and interactions between population density and availability ratio and between population density and opposition to Black-White marriage (see discussion in section 4.4).
The spearman's correlation coefficient between the residuals of the 2 equations is 0.0017 and is not statistically significant at standard levels. This helps explain why we get identical results with simultaneous equations and separate equations: selection into interracial marriage does not account for the effect of 'husband black' in regressions of time that white women devote to Chores. Additionally, the spearman's correlation coefficients between the instruments used in each equation and the residuals from the other equation are low and statistically insignificant, meaning that we can consider instruments in each of the equations as independent from the residuals in the other equation. Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for time devoted to Total Housework by white men. Only 50 white men out of 15,625 were married to black women so these results are only suggestive. The reference category in Column (1) is a childless white man living in the West and observed on Friday. We find a negative delta, as predicted: relative to their endogamous counterparts, intermarried white men devote 0.59 of an hour less to total housework per day. Given that on average they work 1.8 hours in housework, 0.6 is a large coefficient. As was the case for women, effects of intermarriage only appear on weekdays. This effect is only found for married men (col. 4).
Men
Even though there are fewer black men than white men in our data, the number of black men in interracial couples is substantially larger than the number of white men in such couples. Table 7 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for time devoted to Total Housework by black men. Most coefficients of 'intermarried' are statistically insignificant. The only positive coefficients that are statistically significant (at the 5% level) are for very small samples of men with limited labor force participation (Columns 5 and 6).
Other findings
We first discuss other determinants of chores and housework. Then we look at the determinants of selection of a spouse from a different race (equation 4 in the system of simultaneous equations described in section 3).
Wife's education is associated negatively with hours of chores in the case of both white and black women if we use the strict definition of chores (Tables 2 and 3 ). If we use 'housework' (Table 4) , the negative association is only found for white women. In light of the considerations discussed in Section 3.2 this finding is consistent with education enhancing productivity in household production and consequently higher value in marriage markets. This finding may also indicate educated women's higher bargaining power in the household, which allows them to negotiate division of labor arrangements with their husbands that involve fewer chores. This finding is restricted to weekdays, which is consistent with the idea that weekend housework, often shared with other family members, is more 'fun' and less 'work' than weekday housework. Table 6 shows that a lower educational difference (implying a wife with relatively more education) is associated with more housework by men. Also, when we enter wife's education instead of education difference in regressions of men's housework we find that more educated white men do more housework on weekends and if they are married. We also see from Table 2 that when the husbands of white women are relatively more educated these women perform fewer chores on weekends (col. 2) and if they are employed more than 10 hours a week (col. 7). Combined, these results suggest that for more educated white couples time spent on chores and on leisure are complements and not substitutes. This helps explain why positive sorting occurs by education even where the roles of education as earning-enhancing and of colleges as meeting grounds are eliminated, as is the case with movie stars (Bruze 2011 ).
The effect of wage is related to that of education, especially since we use education to estimate predicted wage in cases of respondents or spouses not in the labor force. Actual wage is used wherever available. We find that own wage is associated with fewer hours of chores in the case of white women, using 'chores' (Table 2, col. (1), (3), (4), (7) and (8)) and using 'total housework' (Table 5, cols. (1) to (3)). This finding is restricted to weekdays and possibly reflects an income effect, with weekday chores being an 'inferior' activity. The work may be transferred to substitutes (spouse time or commercial substitutes). We also find a negative effect of wage on men's weekday housework.
On weekends white women, black women, and white men perform more chores if they earn higher wages, indicating again the extra pleasure involved in housework performed on weekends rather than on weekdays.
Husband's wage generally has a positive effect on women's chores and housework and wife's wage is positively associated with white men's household work (Table 6) , possibly reflecting a substitution effect. Husband's wage is positively associated with black women's time in chores on weekends. Non-labor household income has a negative value on the time devoted to Chores for white women, as each 10,000-dollars increase in non-labor income is associated with a decrease of 0.013 hours per day in Chores. A comparison of the coefficients of 'husband black' and non-labor income in Table 2 implies that the presence of a black husband is the equivalent of a decrease of 270,000$ in non-labor household income. In the case of married white women, the equivalent is a decrease of 350,000$ in non-labor household income, and it is 260,000$ in the case of married white women with employed husbands. Since the average nonlabor income for white women is 59,000$ it follows that 'husband black' has a much larger effect than most realistic changes in non-labor income.
As for own age, women's age tends to be positively associated with their time in chores and housework. This may indicate a period effect: time devoted to chores has decreased considerably among U.S. women in the period 1965 to 2000 (Bianchi et al. 2006, Table 5 .1). Age difference is negative and significant in the case of white married women with non-working spouses, possibly because these older men can afford not to be employed and to replace women's chores with hired help. These women may be translating the value of their relative youth in a more leisurely lifestyle, as one expects from trophy wives (see Bloemen and Stancanelli 2008) . However, age difference has a positive sign for black women, suggesting that black women may have fewer opportunities to trade their youth for material benefits in marriage and enjoy the 'trophy wife' lifestyle. In the case of white men, the older they are the more they do housework on weekends. We also find a negative sign of the square of husband's age in the case of married men.
In most regressions, the number of children adds significantly to time devoted to chores. In absolute value, the number of children under age 5 does not affect women's allocation of time to chores significantly more than does being intermarried, and the effect of a child ages 12 to 17 is .29 for white women, which is lower than .36, the coefficient of 'husband black'. Children age 12 to 17 add to the chores work of white women across all samples, but not always in the case of black women. Children also add to men's housework hours, but not as consistently as they do for women. Men do fewer chores in the South than in the West.
Next, we turn to a discussion of the findings regarding the determinants of white women having selected a black husband. It can be seen from column 2 in Table 5 that intermarriages are more likely in densely populated states, which possibly reflects a correlation between population density and more open economic, political, and social institutions. These tend to be states on either coast, with larger cities, more influx of immigrants, and more of a tendency to vote for democrats.
The availability ratio has a negative association with white women's probability of being in couple with a white man, where availability measures the relative number of white men of the right age relative to all men available. This negative sign has to be interpreted in conjunction with that of the interaction between population density and availability. Availability only takes negative values in low-density states, while in highdensity states it turns to positive. For instance, (log) density is 9.20 in the District of Columbia where the total effect of availability is positive (0.08). Overall, this variable is positive in the 35 most densely populated states. In the other states even if white men are 'available' on paper they may not be actually available given that searching for mates is more difficult in low-density states.
It also appears from the same regression that the stronger white women opposed Black-White marriages in 1982, the more a white woman we observe was likely to marry (or live with) a black man. Again, this finding only makes sense in conjunction with population density and the interaction between population density and opposition to Black-White marriages, as the net effect of opposition to marriage between Blacks and Whites is only positive in low-density states, while in high-density states the relationship turns to negative (for instance, in the high-density District of Columbia log density is 9.20 and net the effect is -0.1547. There are 27 states with higher population density where the net effect of opposition to interracial marriage is negative, as we expected.
Discussion
That white women work less at chores if intermarried than if endogamous is consistent with intermarried white women obtaining more access to the gain from marriage, relative to their endogamous counterparts. To the extent that our findings for blacks are reliable and black women work more at chores if intermarried than if in an endogamous relationship, this may mean that they obtain less access to the gain from marriage if intermarried than if endogamous. Suggestive findings for intermarried and endogamous men go in the same direction.
These findings are consistent with a marriage market analysis modeling access to the gain from marriage as a function of demand and supply in multiple marriage markets defined by the ethnicity of both men and women. Relative to their endogamous counterparts, intermarried whites may get higher distributions, and intermarried blacks may get lower distributions in marriage, resulting in lower workloads for intermarried whites and higher workloads for intermarried blacks. Workloads were translated in terms of hours of chores or housework in the case of women, and hours of housework in the case of men.
As predicted, we also find more effects of intermarriage on chores performed on weekdays than on weekends, which is consistent with housework being less likely to be considered 'work' on weekends (Hamermesh 2002, Connelly and Kimmel 2009) . That activities performed on weekends are less likely to be considered 'work' than the same activities performed on weekdays is also apparent from the different effects of own wage on weekends and weekdays (negative sign only on weekdays; positive sign on weekends for white women, black women and white men).
Stronger findings for married women than for unwed women are consistent with married women being more likely to work at home in return for their husbands' work in the labor force than is the case with unmarried women. This marital status differential may be the result of marriage providing some sort of contract that better protects the workers in marriage, relative to the more informal forms of cohabitation (GrossbardShechtman 1993) .
A comparison of our results for chores as reported in tables 2 and 3 and an alternative dependent variable including basic childcare in addition to chores is also consistent with our basic interpretation. The extra premium that white women presumably receive if married to black men (relative to that received by endogamous white women) seems to be larger when home production is less enjoyable (childcare excluded) than when (basic) childcare is included and home production is likely to generate more utility. The larger the presumed transfer the larger the coefficient of 'husband black' (in absolute value). As for married white women with low labor force participation Table 2 suggests that they obtain particularly large intra-household transfers from black husbands, expressed as large reductions in chores as defined above, but when basic childcare is added to the definition of chores the coefficient of 'husband black' is negative but not significant: even if these women receive a larger intra-household transfer from a black husband than from a white husband, they are not as inclined to use it to avoid basic childcare as they are to use it to avoid performing chores.
Alternative models dealing with in-marriage distribution, such as bargaining and collective models, may also explain some of these results. These models also imply racial differentials in distribution of the product of marriage, which can possibly imply differentials in time use. However, an explanation based on bargaining or collective models usually assumes that individuals in intermarried and endogamous couples differ in their remarriage options were they to divorce. In contrast, our predictions apply even if the members of a particular couple do not consider divorce or remarriage as relevant options, as they follow from differences in demand and supply in same-race versus interracial hedonic marriage markets.
The following alternative cultural explanation also accounts for our main finding. 16 It could be that there are black/white differences in culture such that it is well-known that white men expect more chores being performed by women than is the case with black men. Consequently, white women married to black men perform fewer chores and black women married to white men perform more chores relative to the endogamous wives of these men. However, this explanation does not easily explain why this finding would be unique to weekdays and not to weekends. It seems far-fetched to posit that such cultural differences would be unique to weekdays and that they reverse on weekends. In contrast, our proposed explanation accounts for both the general finding that intermarriage has a negative effect on chores for whites, a positive effect on chores for blacks, and the additional finding that intermarriage effects are stronger on weekdays than on weekends.
Conclusions
Time devoted to household production activities by white and black men and women in the US was analyzed as a function of whether they were racially intermarried or not. The analysis originated with Becker's (1973) second Demand and Supply model of marriage, according to which intra-marriage distribution is a function of gain from marriage and conditions in marriage markets. It was predicted that at given incomes and relative to their endogamous counterparts, blacks in couple with whites would perform more chores and that whites in couple with blacks would perform fewer chores. It was also predicted that statistical associations between intermarriage and chores or housework would be strongest in circumstances where household production is more likely to be considered as work rather than as leisure: on weekdays, when couples are married rather than cohabiting, when respondents have low or no participation in the labor force, and when spouses have high levels of labor force participation.
Due to limited sample sizes, robust findings apply mostly to white women. We find that, overall, white women in couple with black partners devote less time to chores (0.36 fewer hours per day) and housework (0.6 fewer hours per day) than their endogamous counterparts. The 'effects' of intermarriage don't seem to be spurious: a two-equation model that endogenizes intermarriage reveals that accounting for selection makes no difference. The size of the intermarriage coefficients is large when compared to that of well-known factors associated with chores, such as the presence of children and non-labor income.
White men also seem to spend less time on housework if intermarried with black women than if married to whites, but estimated effects are smaller and limited to specific subsamples. Even though results for blacks are less robust than for whites, due to smaller sample size, they also suggest that in the US marriage markets whites are a preferred group status: when in couple with whites, black women seem to devote more time to chores and housework than when endogamous. Results for black men seem to go in the same direction but are less conclusive than those for black women. A more indepth analysis with a larger dataset is needed to support the results for black men and women, and white men.
We also found that the effects of intermarriage seem to be stronger on weekdays than on weekends, for married respondents than for cohabitants, and for respondents with limited labor force participation than for respondents with more hours of work in the labor force. These differentials follow from our model based on presumed differentials in distributions in marriage market and don't follow from alternative explanations based on cultural differences.
Our study suggests that blacks pay a price when in couple with whites, in the sense that their partners seem to supply a reduced amount of household production relative to what they can expect from a black partner. Racial intermarriage seems to benefit whites in the form of the extra time their black partners spend on household production. Our findings are consistent with a lower value of blacks in US marriage markets, relative to the value of whites. This may be another disadvantage associated with being black in the US. It is hoped that further studies will provide more accurate tests, allowing verification of this exploratory research.
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